Bradford Group West, Inc. v. James F. Kern, I.N. Fisher, and Loran Corporation, a California corporation : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Bradford Group West, Inc. v. James F. Kern, I.N.
Fisher, and Loran Corporation, a California
corporation : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary A. Anderson; Attorney for Defendant/Appellants.
Scott F. Young; Mark F. James; Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee; Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Bradford v. Kern, No. 920104 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3021
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRADFORD GROUP WEST, INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JAMES F. KERN, I.N. FISHER, and 
LORAN CORPORATION, a California 
corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
Case No. 920104-CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OP PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
District Court Civil No. 910900291 CV 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Gary A. Anderson, Esq. 
Westpark 
750 North Freedom Blvd., Suite 102 
Provo, Utah 85601 
Telephone: (801) 373-6440 
Attorney for 
Defendants/Appellants 
Scott F. Young, Esq. (3890) 
Mark F. James, Esq. (5295) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, 
BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for 
UTAH COURT OF 
BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
Brad.brf 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO qiflM*-C* 
FII.ED 
APR 2898 
kiv T kfcvmifl 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 1 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 2 
Nature of Case 2 
Course of Proceedings Below 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 13 
I. THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH THE MERITS OF 
GUARANTORS' APPEAL BECAUSE GUARANTORS HAVE NOT 
SUPPORTED THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THEIR BRIEF 
WITH PROPER CITATIONS TO THE RECORD AS REQUIRED 
BY THIS COURT'S RULES, 13 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING GUARANTORS' RULE 56(f) REQUEST . . 16 
A. Rule 56(f) Determinations are Left to the 
Sound Discretion of the Trial Court. . . 17 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion 18 
1. Guarantors had adequate time to conduct 
discovery. . . . . . . . 18 
2. Guarantors failed to demonstrate the 
need or relevancy of any additional 
discovery. 20 
-i-
Brad.brf 
Page 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DISMISSAL OF GUARANTORS' COUNTERCLAIM WAS 
PROPER 22 
A. The Financial Institutions Act Does Not 
Govern the Transactions Between Bradford 
and Guarantors. . . . . . . . 22 
1. Bradford is not governed by the 
Financial Institutions Act. . . . 22 
2. Use of the term "realty investment 
banker" does not violate the Financial 
Institutions Act. . . . . . . 24 
3. Even if Bradford were in violation of 
the Financial Institutions Act, that 
would not void Guarantors' obligations. 27 
a. The basis for Guarantors' defenses 
and Counterclaim previously has 
been addressed and rejected. . 27 
b. The cases Guarantors cite do not 
support Guarantors7 defenses or 
Counterclaim. . . . . . . 29 
B. No Private Right of Action Exists to Enforce 
the Financial Institutions Act. . . . 31 
C. Guarantors Have Waived Any Defenses and Claims 
Arising Prior to the Execution of the Note. 34 
1. Guarantors expressly waived their claims 
and defenses 34 
2. Guarantors' conduct resulted in a waiver 
of their defenses and Counterclaim. . 3 7 
CONCLUSION 40 
Brad brf 
-11-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service. 
Inc.. 754 P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988) . . . . 3 
Baqshaw v. Bagshaw. 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) 
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983) . 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 
1988) 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) 
Dinkenspeel v. O'Dav. 47 Utah 18, 151 P. 344 (1915) 
First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of Federal 
Reserve System. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984) 
First Security Bank of Idaho. N.A. v. Gaige. 155 Idaho 
172, 765 P.2d 683 (1988) 3 
Flintridge Station Assocs. v. American Fletcher 
Mortgage Co.. 761 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1985) 
Henderson v. For-Shor Co.. 757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) 
In re Bartell. 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) . . . . 
In re Central Mortgage & Trust Co.. 50 B.R. 1010 (D. 
Tex. 1985) 
In re Republic Financial Corp., 77 B.R. 282, 285 (N.D. 
Okla. 1987) 
Koven v. Cline. 280 N.Y.S. 814 (N.Y. App. 1935) 
Leavitt v. Blohm. 11 Utah 2d 220, 357 P.2d 190 (1960) . 
Marchant v. Marchant. 743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) 
-iii-
Brad brf 
McKeller Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Paxton. 
62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128 (1923) 39 
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co.. 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 
1974) 32 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 
551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 15 
Neerinas v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991) . 21 
Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 764 P.2d 636 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 1, 17 
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1980) 28 
Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987) . . . 21 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), rev'd in part on other grounds. 
1992 WL 14725 (Utah, Jan. 17, 1992) . . . 1, 17 
Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) . . 15 
Shepherd v. Finance Assocs. of Auburn. 316 N.E.2d 
597 (Mass. 1974) 27, 28 
32 
Smith v. Smith. 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) . . . . 21 
State v. Tucker. 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) . . . 14 
Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v. Carnes Corp.. 753 P.2d 964 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 28 
Trees v. Lewis. 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987) . . . . 14, 15 
Voluntary Ass'n v. Goodman. 244 N.Y.S. 328 (N.Y. 
Mun. Ct. 1930) 30 
Brad.brf 
- I V -
RULE 8 
Page 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 42 1, 14, 
15 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 2, 14, 
17 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-101 et seq. 12, 22, 
23, 26, 
28, 29, 
30, 31, 
33 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) 1 
-v-
Brad.brf 
Plaintiff/Appellee Bradford Group West, Inc. ("Bradford") 
hereby submits the following Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee. 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
42. This case was poured-over to the Utah Court of Appeals by 
order of the Utah Supreme Court dated February 19, 1992. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Plaintiff accepts Appellants' statement of the standard 
of review with respect to Appellants' challenge to the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment to plaintiff. The standard 
of review on appeal with respect to the trial court's decision 
regarding whether to allow defendants additional time to conduct 
discovery before ruling on plaintiff's Motion, however, is whether 
the trial court abused its discretion. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 1992 WL 14725 (Utah, Jan. 17, 1992), ("The trial 
court has discretion to determine whether the reasons stated in a 
Rule 56(f) affidavit are adequate."); Reeves v. Geiav 
Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("It 
is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, 
to determine if the reasons stated in the Rule 56(f) affidavit are 
adequate.") 
Brad brf 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
No constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule, 
or regulation necessarily is determinative of this appeal. Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies, however, to the Court's 
appellate decision. That rule provides in relevant part: 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after expiration 
of 2 0 days from the commencement of the action or after 
service of a motion for summary judgment by an adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. . . . The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
In 1985, Bradford provided construction financing to an 
entity known as SLC Limited IV ("SLC") for a project known as the 
Center Pointe project. SLC is a California limited partnership 
whose general partner is Appellant Loran Corporation ("Loran"). 
Brad.brf 
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Appellants James F. Kern ("Kern") and I. N. Fisher ("Fisher") are 
officers of Loran. 
Following the making of the initial construction loan, 
the parties to this lawsuit and SLC made additional agreements 
relating to that loan. One of those agreements, which is more 
fully described in the Statement of Facts set forth below, involved 
the execution of a $100,000 promissory note (the "Note") by SLC in 
favor of Bradford, Loran, Fisher, and Kern guaranteed SLC's 
payment of the Note.1 
After the Note matured and SLC failed to pay the Note, 
Bradford initiated this action to collect the amounts owed pursuant 
to Guarantors' written guarantees (the "Guarantees"). Guarantors 
each have admitted execution and non-payment of the Note and 
execution and nonperformance of the Guarantees. Guarantors 
contend, however, that by using the phrase "realty investment 
banker" on its stationary, Bradford improperly represented itself 
as a "bank" in violation of Title 7 of the Utah Code, which governs 
financial institutions. Guarantors claim that as a result of 
Bradford's purported violation of Title 7, they are absolved of 
their obligation with respect to the Note — which Guarantors claim 
constitutes improper fees charged by Bradford in connection with 
the construction loan. Guarantors also allege that Bradford failed 
1
 Defendants/Appellants Kern, Fisher, and Loran hereinafter 
collectively are referred to as the "Guarantors." 
Brad.brf 
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to make disclosures in connection with the construction loan, 
although that loan is not at issue in this case. Guarantors filed 
a counterclaim against Bradford based on the same legal theories 
that were raised in defense to Bradford's Complaint. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
Bradford commenced this action in January, 1991. Some 
two months after Bradford filed its Complaint, Guarantors filed an 
Answer and Counterclaim. Several days later, Guarantors served a 
set of interrogatories and document requests on Bradford. Bradford 
thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment (the "Motion"), 
pursuant to which Bradford sought judgment in its favor against the 
Guarantors and dismissal of the Guarantors' Counterclaim. Shortly 
thereafter, Bradford served upon Guarantors its responses to 
Guarantors' discovery requests. 
Unable to deny that they had executed and failed to 
perform pursuant to their Guarantees, Guarantors argued that the 
Guarantees should not be enforced because Bradford had not complied 
with Title 7 of the Utah Code, and that Bradford had failed to make 
certain disclosures relating to the earlier construction loan. 
Guarantors also attempted to delay a ruling by Judge Lewis on 
Bradford's Motion for summary judgment by contending that 
additional time for discovery was needed. In response, Bradford 
marshalled the uncontested facts, which established Bradford's 
right to summary judgment and demonstrated that further discovery 
-4-
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was not warranted or useful. Briefing by the parties with respect 
to Bradford's Motion was completed in April of 1991. 
A hearing on Bradford's Motion was not conducted until 
August 14, 199l.2 At the close of the hearing, during which Judge 
Lewis heard oral argument from counsel for the respective parties, 
Judge Lewis ruled that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact and that Bradford was entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law. Guarantors' appeal is from that order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are supported by the record, are the 
same facts that were relied on by Bradford in seeking summary 
judgment at the District Court level, and were accepted as 
undisputed by the Guarantors and by the District Court.3 [See 
2
 During the more than four months between completion of 
briefing and the hearing on Bradford's Motion, Guarantors did not 
conduct any further discovery. 
3
 The trial court found that the seventeen paragraphs upon 
which plaintiff relied in seeking summary judgment and which are 
set forth herein were "not denied by defendants, and are therefore 
admitted, and no genuine issues of material fact exist." See Order 
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing 
Defendant's [sic] Counterclaim , f 3 at p. 2 [R. 231]. 
During oral argument on the Motion, the following 
exchange between the trial court and counsel for Guarantors 
reflects the undisputed nature of the facts upon which Bradford 
relied in seeking summary judgment: 
THE COURT: Let me ask you one additional question. 
Under the rules, I think it's quite clear, counsel, that 
where you have not specifically admitted or denied the 
facts set forth in the memo in support of motion for 
Brad.brf 
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
to Dismiss Counterclaim, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, 
11 1-17 (R. 44-50) ] / 
1. Bradford provided construction financing to SLC in 
relation to a project known as the Center Pointe project. The 
construction loan was evidenced by a Trust Deed Note in the amount 
of $2,200,000.00, dated December 4, 1985, and various other 
documents including Guarantors' Guaranties. In connection with the 
construction loan, SLC executed a "Second Mortgage Endorsement to 
Construction Loan Commitment", a copy of which is attached to the 
Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. as Exhibit B, in which SLC and Fisher, 
Kern, and Loran agreed to pay a $100,000 fee, payable on the 
earlier of the sale or refinance of the Center Pointe project, or 
summary judgment, that the court must deem them admitted. 
Can I get you to respond to that? 
MR. ANDERSON [Counsel for Guarantors]: You mean the 
facts as they stated them? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ANDERSON: We don't dispute the facts, Your 
Honor. We don't dispute the facts . . . . 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, August 14, 
1991, at p. 21 [R. 254]. 
4
 ("R. » refers to the record on appeal). 
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the maturity of the construction loan. [Affidavit of J. Clawson, 
Sr. at % 14 (R. 65-66)].5 
2. In 1988, SLC refinanced the Center Pointe project 
and obtained permanent financing from First Security Bank. The 
First Security permanent loan did not provide enough money to pay 
the entire construction loan and fees owed to Bradford. In order 
to allow the permanent loan to be placed, Bradford agreed to 
release its lien on the Center Pointe project and to accept from 
SLC a note for the $100,000 shortfall. That is the Note which is 
the subject of the Guarantees involved in this lawsuit. [Affidavit 
of J. Clawson, Sr. at f 15 (R. 66) ].6 
3. SLC, for valuable consideration, made, executed, and 
delivered the Note to Bradford on October 7, 1988. [See R. 7-10]. 
Under the terms of the Note, SLC promised to pay Bradford 
$100,000.00 plus interest thereon. [Answer at f 3 (R. 28)]. 
4. On or about October 7, 1988, for valuable 
consideration, Kern made, executed and delivered to Bradford his 
Unconditional Guaranty (the "Kern Guarantee") by which Kern 
guaranteed payment of the Note owed by SLC to Bradford. A copy of 
5
 For the Court's convenience, a copy of the Second Mortgage 
Endorsement to the Construction Loan Commitment is set forth in the 
Addendum hereto as Exhibit "E." 
6
 A copy of the Note is set forth in the Addendum hereto as 
Exhibit "A." 
Brad.brf 
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the Kern Guarantee is attached as Exhibit "B" to Bradford's 
Complaint (R. 11-12). [See Answer at f 6 (R. 29)].7 
5. On or about October 7, 1988, for valuable 
consideration, Fisher made, executed and delivered to Bradford his 
Unconditional Guaranty (the "Fisher Guarantee") by which Fisher 
guaranteed payment of the Note owed by SLC to Bradford. A copy of 
the Fisher Guarantee is attached as Exhibit "C" to Bradford's 
Complaint (R. 13-14). [See Answer at f 9 (R. 29)].8 
6. On or about October 7, 1988, for valuable 
consideration, Loran Corporation, executed and delivered to 
Bradford its Unconditional Guaranty (the "Loran Guarantee") by 
which Loran guaranteed payment of the Note owed by SLC to Bradford. 
A copy of the Loran Guarantee is attached as Exhibit "D" to 
Bradford's Complaint (R. 15-16). [See Answer at f 11 (R. 29)].9 
7. On August 9, 1990, after the Note had matured, SLC, 
by and through its general partner, Loran, entered into an 
Forbearance and Extension Agreement pursuant to which the maturity 
date of the Note was extended to December 31, 1990. The 
Forbearance and Extension Agreement was signed by Kern and Fisher 
7
 A copy of the Kern Guarantee is set forth in the Addendum 
hereto as Exhibit "B." 
8
 A copy of the Fisher Guarantee is set forth in the Addendum 
hereto as Exhibit "C." 
9
 A copy of the Loran Guarantee is set forth in the Addendum 
hereto as Exhibit "D." 
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as officers of Loran. [Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 11 (R. 
65) . A copy of the Forbearance and Extension Agreement is attached 
as Exhibit A (R. 68-71) to the Clawson Affidavit and is set forth 
in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit "F"]. 
8. The Forbearance and Extension Agreement states, in 
paragraph 6, as follows: 
Borrower hereby waives any defenses to payment or 
performance or rights of setoff it may have as of the 
date hereof relating to the Original Loan Documents. 
[Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr, at % 12. (R. 65)]. 
9. On page 4 of the Forbearance and Extension 
Agreement, Fisher and Kern, in their individual capacities as 
guarantors of the Note, accepted and agreed to the terms of the 
Forbearance and Extension Agreement. [Affidavit of J. Clawson, 
Sr. at % 13. (R. 65)]. 
10. The Note matured and became due and payable in full 
by its terms. SLC failed to pay the Note and therefore defaulted 
on its covenants and obligations under the Note, despite demands 
by Bradford that SLC pay the sums due and owing. [Answer at f 4 
(R. 28); Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at f 3 (R. 62)]. 
11. The amount due and owing on the Note from SLC to 
Bradford is as follows: principal in the sum of $100,000.00 with 
accrued unpaid interest to and including January 9, 1991, of 
$1,434.45, all interest accruing thereafter on the unpaid principal 
at the default rate of interest until all such principal is paid 
-9-
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in full, together with late charges in the amount of $4,500.00. 
Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 4 (R. 62).] 
12. As a result of his execution of the Kern Guarantee, 
and the obligation of SLC to Bradford, as described herein, Kern 
became indebted to Bradford in the principal sum of $100,000.00 
with accrued unpaid interest to and including January 9, 1991, of 
$1,434.45, all interest accruing thereafter on the unpaid principal 
at the default rate of interest provided in the Note until all such 
principal is paid in full, together with late charges in the amount 
of $4,500.00, together with Bradford's court costs and attorneys' 
fees. [Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at f 6. (R 63)]. 
13. As a consequence of his execution of the Fisher 
Guarantee, and the obligation of SLC to Bradford, Fisher became 
indebted to Bradford in the principal sum of $100,000.00 with 
accrued unpaid interest to and including January 9, 1991, of 
$1,434.45, all interest accruing thereafter on the unpaid principal 
at the default rate of interest provided in the Note until all such 
principal is paid in full, together with late charges in the amount 
of $4,500.00, together with Bradford's court costs and attorneys' 
fees. [Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at f 8 (R. 63 and 64)]. 
14. As a consequence of the execution of the Loran 
Guarantee, and the obligation of SLC to Bradford, Loran Corporation 
became indebted to Bradford in the principal sum of $100,000.00 
with accrued unpaid interest to and including January 9, 1991, of 
-10-
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$1,434.45, all interest accruing thereafter on the unpaid 
principal, at the default rate of interest provided in the Note 
until all such principal is paid in full, together with late 
charges in the amount of $4,500,00, together with Bradford's court 
costs and attorneys' fees. [Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 10 
(R. 64)]. 
15. Bradford is engaged in the real estate services 
business. On Bradford's stationery and business cards, Bradford 
uses the words "realty investment banker". Bradford is a member 
of the Mortgage Banker's Association of America. [Affidavit of J. 
Clawson, Sr. at f 16 (R. 66)]. 
16. Bradford does not accept from the public deposits 
that are subject to withdrawal by check or similar instrument, nor 
is it authorized to engage in the business of accepting depository 
accounts. [Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 17 (R. 66)]. 
17. Bradford is not subject to regulation by the Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions. Bradford is not audited by, 
does not file any reports or statements with, and is not required 
to be licensed by or file reports with, that Department. 
[Affidavit of J. Clawson Sr. at % 18. (R. 66)]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the District Court's ruling and 
dismiss Guarantors' appeal. This Court can do so without reaching 
the merits of the appeal because Appellants have failed to cite in 
-11-
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their Brief to this Court admissible and proper record support and 
to marshall evidence in support of their claims as required by the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Even if this Court chooses to reach the merits of 
Guarantors' appeal, this Court still should affirm Judge Lewis' 
ruling for any of several independent reasons. First, the trial 
court properly ruled that the Financial Institutions Act (Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-1-101 et seq.) as a matter of law does not govern the 
transactions between Bradford and Guarantors. Use of the terms 
"mortgage banker" or "realty banker" does not violate the Financial 
Institutions Act. Second, even were Bradford subject to the 
Financial Institutions Act and assuming Bradford did violate the 
Financial Institutions Act, which Bradford did not, that would not 
void the Guarantors' obligations to Bradford. Third, even were 
Bradford subject to the Financial Institutions Act and even had it 
violated it, no private right of action exists that would permit 
the Guarantors to enforce violations of the Financial Institutions 
Act. Fourth, Guarantors clearly and unequivocally waived in 
writing any by their conduct claims or defenses arising prior to 
the execution of the Note, which include the Counterclaim and 
defense Guarantors asserted in the trial court. They also are 
estopped from asserting those defenses and Counterclaim. 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
connection with the Guarantors' Rule 56(f) request to conduct 
-12-
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additional discovery prior to the trial court ruling on Bradford's 
Motion. Guarantors had sufficient time to conduct discovery. Some 
seven months passed after Bradford filed its Motion until Judge 
Lewis ruled on the Motion. Over four months went by after 
Guarantors requested additional time to conduct discovery until the 
District Court conducted the hearing and ruled on Bradford's 
Motion. During that period, and despite Guarantors' purported need 
for additional discovery, Guarantors neither conducted nor 
attempted to conduct any discovery. Perhaps equally as important 
as their failure to conduct discovery, despite ample time to do so, 
is the fact that, in light of the legal nature of the matters at 
issue, additional discovery of the nature Guarantors desired to 
conduct as described in the Rule 56(f) affidavit of their counsel 
was unnecessary and irrelevant to the merits of Bradford's Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THI8 COURT MEED NOT REACH THE MERITS OF GUARANTORS1 APPEAL 
BECAUSE GUARANTORS HAVE NOT SUPPORTED THE FACTS SET FORTH IN 
THEIR BRIEF WITH PROPER CITATIONS TO THE RECORD AS REQUIRED 
BY THIS COURT»S RULES. 
On pages 8 through 11 of Appellants' Brief — paragraphs 
1 through 9, Guarantors purport to set forth facts relevant to the 
issues before this Court. Those facts, however, are not supported 
by admissible evidence in the record and may not be considered. 
Paragraphs 1 through 6 of the Guarantors' statement are a 
restatement of the facts stated in their memorandum in opposition 
-13-
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to Bradford's motion for summary judgment filed in the district 
court. [See R. 88-91]. Those statements, both at the lower court 
level and on appeal, are unsupported by any affidavit or other 
evidence in the record. Judge Lewis of the District Court properly 
ruled that those statements did not constitute a denial of the 
undisputed facts relied on by Bradford. [See Transcript of Hearing 
on Motion for Summary Judgment, August 14, 1991, at p. 21 (R. 254); 
id. at R. 254]. Paragraph 7 similarly is not supported by record 
citation. 
There also is no record support for Guarantors' erroneous 
assertion set forth in paragraph 9 of Guarantors' Statement of 
Facts that ''Plaintiff/Respondent admits that it used the word 
"bank" and "banker" on its stationary and business cards." Rather, 
Bradford acknowledged using the words "realty investment banker" 
in its business. [See R. 49]. Guarantors' citation to page 56 of 
the record apparently is in error inasmuch as that page provides 
no support for Guarantors' factual assertion. 
In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated as follows: 
We need not reach the merits of this dispute for several 
reasons. First, [appellant] has not supported the facts 
set forth in his brief with citations to the record as 
required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) 
(Supp. 1986). In State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 
(Utah 1982), we interpreted Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
75 (p) (2) (2) (d) , the forerunner of Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(6), and stated: 
Brad brf 
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This Court will assume the correctness of the 
judgment below if counsel on appeal does not 
comply with the requirements of Rule 
75 (p) (2) (2) (d) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as to making a concise statement of facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where they 
are supported. 
Trees, 738 P.2d at 612-13. 
In Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 
551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) , this Court observed: 
In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact, 
a party "must marshall the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, 
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus 
making them clearly erroneous.'" In re Bartell, 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. 
Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). See also, e.g. . 
Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); 
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), Appellants often overlook or disregard this 
heavy burden. When the duty to marshall is not properly 
discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as 
valid." (Citations omitted). 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co., 783 P. 2d at 553 (emphasis added). 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(7) presently 
provides that "[all] statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record." 
Rule 24(a)(9) states that the appellant's "argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." Appellants' Brief not only is 
inadequate with respect to citations to the record, it also fails 
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to marshall relevant, admissible evidence in support of Guarantors' 
arguments. 
Because Guarantors have failed to comply with the 
applicable rules of this Court, this Court should refuse to 
consider the merits of this appeal and should assume the 
correctness of Judge Lewis' Order granting summary judgment to 
Bradford and dismissing Guarantors' Counterclaim. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
GUARANTORS* RULE 56(f) REQUEST. 
Judge Lewis of the District Court did not abuse her 
discretion when she ruled on Bradford's Motion without delaying to 
allow Guarantors more time to conduct additional discovery. In 
response to Bradford's Motion, Guarantors submitted the Affidavit 
of Gary Anderson wherein Mr. Anderson stated that additional 
discovery was needed concerning the relationship between Bradford 
and the Guarantors, the relationship of Bradford to other lending 
institutions from which Bradford may have obtained money, and the 
representations, if any, made by Bradford concerning its "banking 
status." See Affidavit of Gary J. Anderson [R. 147-150]. None of 
these requested discovery matters are relevant to the disposition 
of Bradford's Motion. Even if they were, however, Guarantors 
Brad.brf 
-16-
conducted discovery on those issues and had ample time to conduct 
additional discovery had they so chosen. 
A, Rule 56(f) Determinations are Left to the Sound 
Discretion of the Trial Court. 
To delay a summary judgment ruling in order to conduct 
discovery, a party must make an appropriate showing demonstrating 
a need and right to such discovery. Such a showing normally 
requires that party seeking the delay file a Rule 56(f) affidavit 
setting forth reasons for the delay. See Reeves v. Geigy 
Pharmaceutical. Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 1992 WL 14725 (Utah, Jan. 17, 1992); Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). The trial court then must determine 
whether the reasons stated in the affidavit are adequate, whether 
additional discovery might make any difference to the Court's 
decision on the pending summary judgment motion, or whether the 
movant is simply delaying or on a "fishing expedition." This 
determination is left to the sound discretion of the trial court 
and should not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. 
See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) ("The trial court has discretion to determine whether 
the reasons stated in a Rule 56(f) affidavit are adequate."); 
Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639 ("It is for the trial court, in the 
10
 See Bradford's Answers to Interrogatories and its Response 
to Request for Production of Documents set forth in the Addendum 
to Appellants' Brief. 
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exercise of its sound discretion, to determine if the reasons 
stated in the Rule 56(f) affidavit are adequate.''). 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion. 
Judge Lewis of the District Court did not abuse her 
discretion when she ruled on Bradford's Motion for Summary Judgment 
without allowing further delay for additional discovery by 
Guarantors. 
1. Guarantors had adequate time to conduct discovery. 
Guarantors had adequate time to conduct discovery and in 
fact had conducted discovery on the issues stated in the Rule 56(f) 
affidavit. Guarantors filed their Answer and Counterclaim in this 
case on February 27, 1991. [R. 28-34]. Four days later, 
Guarantors initiated discovery by serving their First Set of 
Interrogatories and their Request for Production of Documents. [R. 
35]. In their Interrogatories, Guarantors requested information 
concerning the original construction loan made by Bradford to SLC, 
Bradford's corporate structure, Bradford's filings and approvals 
with government agencies, Bradford's use of the word "bank," and 
the SLC loan history. In their Request for Production of 
Documents, Guarantors requested production of all documents 
relating to the original construction loan and all documents 
relating to "monies [Bradford] obtained to finance said loan from 
Dime Bank, any other banks including banks specifically located in 
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Idaho,"11 On March 19, 1991, Bradford responded to these requests 
by answering the interrogatories and agreeing to produce non-
privileged documents at any mutually convenient time and place. 
[See R. 84-87; Addendum to Appellants' Brief.] Thereafter, 
Guarantors conducted no further inquiry.12 
Bradford filed its Motion on March 22, 1991. [R. 42-43]. 
The Motion had been fully briefed and was submitted for decision 
on April 23, 1991. [R. 176-78].13 The court initially set the 
motions for hearing on July 12, 1991, [R. 189], which would have 
allowed Guarantors approximately three additional months to conduct 
discovery. Subsequently, at the Guarantors' request, the hearing 
was continued another month, until August 14, 1991. [R. 195]. 
Some seven months passed between the date Bradford filed 
its Complaint and the date of the hearing on Bradford's Motion. 
11
 See Addendum to Appellants' Brief. 
12
 Guarantors' assertion at the bottom of page 15 of 
Appellants' Brief regarding the purported inadequacy of Bradford's 
discovery responses is unfounded. If Guarantors believed that 
Bradford's discovery responses somehow were deficient, they should 
have notified Bradford of such belief and requested that the 
purported deficiencies be corrected. Or Guarantors should have 
filed a motion seeking to compel "proper" responses. Guarantors 
did neither. 
13
 Bradford also filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of I. 
N. Fisher and Gary J. Anderson and to Strike Defendants' Statement 
of Undisputed Material Facts. [See R. 169-175]. 
An Amended Notice to Submit for Decision was filed with the 
trial court on April 25, 1991. [R. 179-181]. 
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Four months passed between the date Guarantors submitted a Rule 
56(f) Affidavit seeking time for additional discovery and the date 
of the hearing. During those time periods, Guarantors had the 
opportunity to review Bradford's documents and pursue any other 
discovery that they desired. They failed to do so. Accordingly, 
Judge Lewis acted well within her sound discretion when she ruled 
on Bradford's Motion in August, 1991 without delaying further her 
decision on the Motion. 
2. Guarantors failed to demonstrate the need or 
relevancy of any additional discovery. 
In addition to having adequate time to conduct discovery, 
thus making unnecessary a grant of additional time for Guarantors 
to conduct discovery, Guarantors failed to show a need for 
additional discovery. The undisputed facts in this case make clear 
that Bradford is not a financial institution subject to the 
provisions of the Financial Institutions Act.u Even if Bradford 
were subject to the Financial Institutions Act and somehow violated 
it, which Bradford is not and did not, as set forth below there is 
no legal basis for a finding that such violation would absolve 
Guarantors of their obligations to Bradford pursuant to their 
14
 Indeed, paragraph 17 of Bradford's Statement of Undisputed 
Facts of its memorandum filed in the trial court in support of 
Bradford's Motion stated that "Bradford is not subject to 
regulation by the Utah State Department of Financial Institutions." 
[R. 50]. As previously noted, Guarantors did not controvert any 
of the facts upon which Bradford based its Motion. 
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Guarantees. Additionally, Guarantors expressly waived any defenses 
and claims arising prior to August 9, 1990. Guarantors' purported 
desire to conduct discovery regarding events transpiring prior to 
that date is irrelevant. Because Guarantors failed to demonstrate 
a need for the additional discovery, Judge Lewis properly chose not 
to further delay a ruling on Bradford's Motion.15 
15
 Guarantors complain that the trial court failed to make 
appropriate findings on the discovery issue. This argument is 
curious in light of the fact that, although given the opportunity 
to do so, counsel for Guarantors failed to present Guarantors' 
56(f) argument during oral argument before the trial court. FSee 
R. 234-266]. 
Guarantors do not assert that the trial court's failure 
to make findings regarding the discovery issue constitutes error. 
They imply that it may, however, by stating that "This Court and 
the Court of Appeals have ruled in a long line of cases that a case 
will be reversed or remanded where findings were inadequate to 
support the conclusions," [Appellants' Brief at 16-17], and by 
citing three cases: Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987); 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) ; and Marchant v. Marchant, 
743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Each of those cases involved 
child custody determinations, which require written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law by the trial court, that bear no 
relevance to the 56(f) issue in this case. 
The District Court adequately set forth in its Order 
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing 
Defendant's [sic] Counterclaim" the basis for its ruling. [See R. 
230-31]. Judge Lewis found that the facts upon which Bradford 
relied in seeking summary judgment had been admitted by Guarantors, 
that Bradford is not a bank or financial institution, and that, 
even if Bradford were a bank or financial institution, it had not 
violated the Utah Financial Institutions Act. [R. 221]. By ruling 
that summary judgment was proper, the trial court necessarily ruled 
that additional discovery was not necessary and/or appropriate. 
Even if the District Court had failed to make any 
statement regarding the reasons for its grant of summary judgment, 
such failure would not have been improper. In Neerinas v. Utah 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OP SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL 
OF GUARANTORS' COUNTERCLAIM WAS PROPER. 
The basis for Guarantors' defenses to Bradford's 
Complaint as well as for their Counterclaim is that Bradford 
improperly held itself out as a "bank" in violation of the 
provisions of Utah's Financial Institutions Act. Based on the 
undisputed facts before it, Judge Lewis properly rejected 
Guarantors' baseless defenses and Counterclaim and correctly 
granted summary judgment as requested by Bradford. 
A. The Financial Institutions Act Does Not Govern the 
Transactions Between Bradford and Guarantors. 
Guarantors' reliance on the Financial Institutions Act 
as the basis for its defenses and Counterclaim in the District 
Court is misplaced. 
1. Bradford is not governed by the Financial 
Institutions Act. 
The Financial Institutions Act does not apply to Bradford 
because Bradford is not a "financial institution" as defined by the 
Financial Institutions Act. The Act gives the Utah State 
Department of Financial Institutions responsibility for executing 
all laws relating to financial institutions and other persons 
subject to Title 7. See Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-201. The Financial 
State Bar, 817 FT27r320, 323 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court 
observed that "[w]hile it may be instructive for the trial court 
to inform the litigants of the legal basis for its decision, we are 
not persuaded that failure to do so constitutes reversible error." 
-22-
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Institutions Act defines a "financial institution" as "any 
institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department because 
of this title". Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-103(13). An "institution 
subject to jurisdiction of the department" is defined as any 
institution described in Article 5 of the Act (which lists banks, 
savings and loans, and similar entities) "except to the extent 
those institutions or persons are engaged solely in making or 
soliciting loans to residents of this state or loans secured by 
real property located in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-
103(21). 
The Financial Institutions Act is designed to regulate 
deposit-taking activities, not loan making. For example, under the 
Act, all "banks" are subject to the jurisdiction, supervision, and 
examination of the Department of Financial Institutions. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-1-501. A "bank" is defined as an institution 
authorized by law "to accept deposits from the public". Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-1-103(1) and § 7-3-3(1) (a). 
It is undisputed that Bradford is not authorized to 
accept from the public deposits that are subject to withdrawal by 
check or similar instrument. [See R. 49 at % 16]. It likewise is 
undisputed that Bradford is not authorized to engage in the 
business of accepting depository accounts. [Id.] Judge Lewis 
properly concluded based on the undisputed facts before her that 
the Financial Institutions Act does not apply to Bradford and thus 
-23-
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summary judgment was appropriate with respect to Guarantors' 
defenses and Counterclaim. 
Under a definition of financial institution similar to 
that found in the Financial Institutions Act, the federal district 
court in Texas held that a mortgage company in the business of 
originating and servicing mortgage loans and selling interests in 
mortgage loan pools was not a "state bank", because it did not have 
the power to accept deposits. See In re Central Mortgage & Trust 
Co. . 50 B.R. 1010 (D. Tex. 1985).16 
The banking statutes relied upon by Guarantors regulate 
deposit-taking activities and are not applicable to Bradford's 
business or to the transactions that are the subject of this 
lawsuit. Judge Lewis properly made this determination and 
correctly granted summary judgment to Bradford. This Court should 
affirm Judge Lewis' decision. 
2. Use of the term "realty investment banker" does not 
violate the Financial Institutions Act. 
There is no dispute that Bradford has used the term 
"realty investment banker" in identifying itself to the public. 
16
 Similarly, a mortgage company which does not accept deposits 
does not fall within the federal definition of a bank. Flintridge 
Station Assocs. v. American Fletcher Mortgage Co., 761 F.2d 434 
(7th Cir. 1985) ; see also In re Republic Financial Corp.. 77 B.R. 
282, 285 (N.D. Okla. 1987) (an entity without the power to receive 
general deposits is not a bank) and First Bancorporation v. Board 
of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, 728 F.2d 434, 436 (10th Cir. 
1984) ("bank" is an institution that accepts deposits that the 
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand). 
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Use of this term, however, which is synonymous with the term 
''mortgage banker," does not violate the Financial Institutions Act. 
Indeed, the terms "investment banker" and "mortgage banker" are 
common in the commercial world and have commonly understood 
meanings completely apart from the traditional use of the word 
"bank" that is proscribed in the Financial Institutions Act. Those 
terms do not imply any deposit-taking function, which is the 
activity regulated by the Act. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th 
Edition, provides the following definitions: 
Bank. A bank is an institution, usually incorporated, 
whose business it is to receive money on deposit, cash 
checks or drafts, discount commercial paper, make loans, 
and issue promissory notes payable to bearer, known as 
bank notes. 
Mortgage banker. A person or firm engaged in the 
business of dealing in mortgages including their 
placement and refinancing. Normally such banker uses its 
own funds as opposed to a commercial or savings and loan 
bank which uses primarily funds of depositors. While 
some mortgage bankers do provide long term (permanent) 
financing, the majority specialize in short term and 
interim financing. 
Investment banker. An underwriter, the middleman between 
the corporation issuing new securities and the public. 
The usual practice is for one or more investment banks 
to buy outright from a corporation a new issue of stocks 
or bonds. The group forms a syndicate to sell the 
securities to individuals and to sell the securities to 
individuals and institutions. Investment bankers also 
distribute very large blocks of stocks or bonds-perhaps 
held by an estate. Thereafter the market in the security 
may be over-the-counter or on a stock exchange. 
In arguing that Bradford's use of the phrase "mortgage 
banker" or "realty investment banker" is a violation of the 
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Financial Institutions Act, Guarantors ignore the common sense 
application and intent of the Act. The Financial Institutions Act 
allows such use of the word "bank," where use of the word is not 
likely to cause confusion: 
Notwithstanding any other restriction in this section, 
the prohibition of the use of specific names and words 
in subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) does not apply 
if the effect of the use of the name or word would not 
likely lead any person to reasonably believe that a 
person or his place of business is a financial 
institution, or is conducting a business subject to the 
jurisdiction of the department. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-701(8)(a) (emphasis added).17 
There is no evidence, or even assertion, in this case to 
the effect that Guarantors ever believed or reasonably could have 
believed that Bradford met the statutory requirements of a 
"business subject to the jurisdiction of the department" — i.e., 
that Bradford was taking deposits, could accept deposits, or wanted 
to be a depositary institution for Guarantors. Bradford never has 
operated as a "bank" or held itself out as a "bank" for purposes 
of the Financial Institutions Act. Guarantors admitted this in the 
17
 For this reason, use of terms such as "blood bank", "food 
bank," "realty investment banker," and other such usage of the word 
"bank" obviously does not subject the user to the provisions of the 
Financial Institutions Act. 
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trial court. [See paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Statement of Facts 
set forth above] .18 
3. Even if Bradford were in violation of the Financial 
Institutions Act, that would not void Guarantors' 
obligations. 
There is no legal basis for a finding that a violation 
of the Utah Financial Institutions Act by Bradford would absolve 
Guarantors of their clear obligations under their Guarantees. 
a. The basis for Guarantors1 defenses and 
Counterclaim previously has been addressed and 
rejected. 
The theory raised by the Guarantors — i.e., that 
violation of an act such as Utah's Financial Institutions Act 
absolves an obligor of some or all of his obligations — previously 
has been addressed and rejected. For example, in Shepherd v. 
Finance Assocs. of Auburn, 316 N.E.2d 597 (Mass. 1974), the 
borrower argued that notes and mortgages made by the borrower were 
void because the lender was conducting a "banking business" in 
violation of state law. The court rejected this argument and ruled 
that any violation of state law was irrelevant to the borrower's 
liability: 
18
 Those facts establish that Bradford does not accept from the 
public deposits which are subject to withdrawal by check or similar 
instrument, nor is it authorized to engage in the business of 
accepting depository accounts. Bradford is not subject to 
regulation by the Utah State Department of Financial Institutions. 
Bradford is not audited by that Department, does not file any 
reports or statements with that Department, and is not required to 
be licensed by or file reports with that Department. 
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Even so, the plaintiff is afforded no basis for relief. 
Chapter 167 [the State Banking law] affords a specific 
remedy for its violation, beginning with an examination 
by the Commissioner of Banks and culminating in possible 
fines, assessment of expenses and injunctive orders . . 
No mention is made of any effect on the public 
transactions entered into by an offending corporation. 
We are unwilling to assume that the legislature intended 
to effect such a forfeiture of private contractual 
rights. 
Id. at 601. 
The same conclusion properly is drawn from the Utah 
statutes. The Financial Institutions Act makes no mention that any 
violation of its provisions voids the private obligations of note 
makers and guarantors. Rather, the statute gives exclusive and 
extensive enforcement powers to the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions. The Commissioner is allowed 
to inspect corporations, to take possession of financial 
institutions, to issue cease and desist orders, and to collect the 
debts owed to seized institutions. See Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-1 et 
seq. The Guarantors may not avoid their private, contractual 
obligations by alleging that Bradford may be subject to some future 
enforcement action brought by the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions.19 
19
 Utah Courts have on various occasions reiterated that 
parties are free to make their own contracts and that courts will 
not make a better contract for a party than what the parties have 
agreed. See, e.g., Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 753 
P. 2d 964, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Court cannot make better 
contract for a party than what parties have agreed to); Rio Alaom 
Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). 
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In Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court observed that "with few exceptions, 
it is still axiomatic in contract law that 'persons dealing at 
arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms without 
the interference of the courts for the purpose of relieving one 
side or the other from the effects of a bad bargain'". As 
expressly admitted by Guarantors, the parties in this case agreed 
to certain interest rates and fees in connection with the 
construction loan. [See Paragraph 1 of Bradford's Statement of 
Facts]. Later, when the construction loan was refinanced, $100,000 
of the loan remained unpaid. Plaintiff agreed to accept the Note 
and the Guarantees for the remaining balance. The agreement to pay 
interest and fees was valid at the time it was made, and the 
subsequent execution of the Note and Guarantees reaffirmed the 
validity. [See Statement of Facts set forth above, Paragraphs 2-
14]. 
b. The cases Guarantors cite do not support 
Guarantors1 defenses or Counterclaim. 
In support of their argument that a violation of the 
Financial Institutions Act voids the Note owed to Bradford, 
In Utah, any private party can contract to lend money, 
and in doing so, the parties can agree to any interest rates and 
fees. The general usury laws in Utah were repealed in 1969 (see 
former U.C.A. § 7-1-2 and § 7-l-2a). In commercial transactions, 
parties may agree on any interest in exchange for a loan of money. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. 
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Guarantors cite to three older decisions from New York. One of 
these cases involved a usurious promissory note that was held void. 
See Koven v. Cline. 280N.Y.S. 814 (N.Y. App. 1935). The other two 
cases involved the exercise of banking powers in violation of the 
New York banking statute. In each case, the contract that was 
voided had arisen directly out of an illegal act. Those decisions 
rely on an express provision in the New York statute that declared 
such instruments void. See Voluntary Ass'n v. Goodman, 244 N.Y.S. 
328, 330 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1930). The Utah statute contains no 
similar provision, and in fact implies just the opposite by giving 
power to the commissioner to seize and collect assets of 
institutions (such as notes payable to the institution). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-2-1 et seq. 
In Dinkenspeel v. Q'Dav, 47 Utah 18, 151 P. 344 (1915), 
the plaintiff leased a building from O'Day for the purpose of 
operating an illegal gambling house. When O'Day was facing 
foreclosure, the plaintiff loaned money to O'Day to preserve the 
gambling operation. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the 
property. O'Day subsequently defaulted on the loan owed to the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff sued to enforce the note and foreclose 
the mortgage. O'Day argued that the note was void because it was 
made for the purpose of furthering the illegal gambling activities. 
In enforcing the note, the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
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As already pointed out, there was nothing illegal or 
immoral in lending the money, or in executing the note 
evidencing the loan, or in giving the mortgage to secure 
it. What the defendant complains of lies back of that 
transaction and has no necessary connection with it. 
Id. at 346. 
In this case, the Note and Guarantees are not illegal in 
any sense, nor is there any allegation that would make them or any 
aspect of any of the transactions relevant to this case illegal. 
The lending of money, with interest and fees to be charged, is a 
lawful act by any person or entity. Guarantors may not avoid their 
valid obligations by alleging a violation of a state statute that 
does not regulate this transaction and that, even if it did, would 
not void it. 
B. No Private Right of Action Exists to Enforce the 
Financial Institutions Act, 
Even if Bradford's use of the term "realty investment 
banker" in its correspondence were a violation of the Financial 
Institutions Act, that violation would not provide a defense to 
payment of Guarantors' obligations. Enforcement of the Financial 
Institutions Act is the exclusive responsibility of the Department 
of Financial Institutions. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-1-201 and 7-
1-321. Guarantors' defenses and Counterclaim, which erroneously 
presuppose that an implied private right of action exists to 
enforce the Act, therefore must fail as a matter of law. Indeed, 
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Guarantors cite no case implying a private right of action under 
Utah's Financial Institutions Act or under any similar act. 
Under Utah law, a private right of action is not implied 
from a violation of a state statute that does not clearly provide 
for such private right of action.20 Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court 
has observed in this regard that courts should refrain from 
fashioning such a remedy. Rather, "it is a matter best left to the 
legislature." Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 
1974) (decided after Cort v. Ash). See Shepard v. Finance Assocs. 
of Auburn. 316 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Mass. 1974) ("We are unwilling to 
assume that the legislature intended to effect . . . a forfeiture 
of private contractual rights" as a result of a violation of state 
banking laws.)21 
20
 Guarantors' implied private right of action analysis fails, 
among other reasons, because it deals with implied private rights 
of action under federal statutes and fails to address implied 
rights of action under Utah law. 
21
 Even applying the Cort v. Ash analysis that Guarantors 
advance, Guarantors cannot establish that a private right of action 
for violation of the Financial Institutions Act should be implied. 
Guarantors contend that the first prong of the Cort v. 
Ash analysis (i.e., that the plaintiff is "one of the class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted — that is, does 
the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?") is 
satisfied because the public is the primary party for whose benefit 
the statute was passed and Guarantors are members of the public. 
Appellants7 Brief at 29. This broad brush analysis is flawed. The 
clear purpose of the Financial Institutions Act is to protect 
depositors of state regulated banks. Guarantors are not a member 
of that class. Furthermore, under Guarantors' overly simplistic 
approach, a private cause of action would be implied under all 
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Even if Guarantors were able to show that a private right 
of action did exist under the Financial Institutions Act, 
Guarantors' claims still would fail because they have alleged no 
damage arising out of or caused by Bradford's use of the term 
public laws — at least with respect to the first prong of the 
analysis. Such is not the case. Even if the general public were 
the class for whose especial benefit the Financial Institutions Act 
was intended, the fact that the Act exists to protect the general 
public — and not specified classes, would weigh heavily in favor 
of not implying individual rights of action under the statute. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Ash noted specifically that the 
question is whether the statute creates a federal right in favor 
of the plaintiff. The state law at issue in this case clearly does 
not imply a federal right. 
The second prong — whether there is any indication of 
legislative intent to create or deny such a remedy — makes clear 
that a private right of action should not be implied under the 
Financial Institutions Act. Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-102(1)(a) 
expressly provides that "It is the purpose of this title to expand 
and strengthen the duties, powers and responsibilities of the 
Department of Financial Institutions and to place under its 
jurisdiction all classes of institutions and other businesses 
engaged in furnishing financial services to the people of this 
state, . . . ." (Emphasis added). 
The final prong of the analysis ("is the cause of action 
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the 
concern of the states so that it would be inappropriate to infer 
a cause of action based solely on federal law?) likewise 
demonstrates that a private cause of action should not be implied 
under the Financial Institutions Act. This prong demonstrates the 
impropriety of attempting to apply the Cort v. Ash analysis to the 
state law at issue. The Financial Institutions Act is not only 
relegated to state law, it is state law and the concern of the 
State. 
Thus, even were this Court to apply the Cort v. Ash 
analysis to the Financial Institutions Act in determining whether 
a private right of action under the Act should be implied, that 
analysis makes clear that a private right of action should not be 
implied under the Act. 
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"bank". Guarantors' only allegations concerning damage are that 
Guarantors have paid interest, costs, and fees under the loan 
documents• As shown above, interest, costs, and fees can be 
charged by any private party, according to contract, and do not 
constitute recoverable damages to which Guarantors are entitled. 
C. Guarantors Have Waived Any Defenses and Claims Arising 
Prior to the Execution of the Note.^ 
The undisputed evidence in the District Court makes clear 
that Guarantors have waived their defenses to Bradford's Complaint 
as well as any right to assert their Counterclaim. 
1. Guarantors expressly waived their claims and 
defenses. 
Guarantors waived in writing their defenses and 
Counterclaim that were asserted in the District Court. After 
entering into the construction loan commitment pertaining to the 
Center Pointe protect in 1985, Guarantors in 1988 executed a 
document entitled "Second Mortgage Endorsement to Construction Loan 
Commitment," which modified the terms and conditions of the 
22
 Although the District Court did not specifically address 
Bradford's waiver argument in its ruling granting summary judgment 
and dismissing Guarantors7 Counterclaim, this Court properly may 
do so. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 
895 (Utah 1988) (Appellate court "may affirm trial court's 
decisions on any proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having 
assigned another reason for its ruling."); Baashaw v. Baashaw, 788 
P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]his court may affirm 'if 
the trial court's decision can be sustained on any proper legal 
basis.'" (quoting Taylor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
Brad brf 
-34-
construction loan commitment, [See Guarantor's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss Counterclaim f 2, at 2 (R. 89) and 
Exhibit B thereto (R. 118-119)]. In that Second Mortgage 
Endorsement to Construction Loan Commitment, Guarantors agreed to 
pay a "'$100,000 additional fee' . . • due and payable upon the 
sale of the property in question, the refinancing of the loan, or 
at loan maturity as extended, whichever comes first,"23 Guarantors 
have admitted that the $100,000 loan fee was drawn against the loan 
proceeds on or about November 28, 1986, [id.], and have 
acknowledged that the proceeds of their loan from First Security 
Bank ($2,100,000) were insufficient to pay the $2,200,000 principal 
balance of the loan from Bradford and that Guarantors therefore 
executed in favor of Bradford the Note, a trust deed, the 
Guarantees, and a security agreement in favor of Bradford for the 
amount of the shortfall — $100,000 — together with interest. 
[See Guarantors' "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and to 
Dismiss Counterclaim" %% 5-6, at p.3 (R. 90) and Exhibits E and F 
to that memorandum (R. 122-126; R. 127-140)]. 
23
 See Guarantors' memorandum filed in opposition to Bradford's 
Motion at K 2 (R. 89) and Exhibit B to that memorandum (R. 118-
119); see also Exhibit "F" of the Addendum to this Brief]. 
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After the Note matured in 1990, SLC entered into an 
Forbearance and Extension Agreement pursuant to which the maturity 
date of the Note was extended to December 31, 1990. The 
Forbearance and Extension Agreement was signed by Kern and Fisher 
as officers of Loran and was accepted and agreed to by Kern and 
Fisher as Guarantors of the Note. [See Forbearance and Extension 
Agreement (R. 65, f 13; R. 68-71), a copy of which is set forth in 
the Addendum hereto as Exhibit "F"]. The Forbearance and Extension 
Agreement contained an express waiver to claims and defenses 
relating to Bradford's enforcement of the Note and Guarantees: 
Borrower hereby waives any defenses to payment or 
performance or rights of setoff it may have as of the 
date hereof relating to the original loan documents. 
[See Affidavit of J. Clawson, Sr. at % 12 (R. 65) ; see also R. 68-
71]. 
It is undisputed that Guarantors' defenses to enforcement 
of the Note and Guarantees, as well as the basis for their 
Counterclaim, arose prior to the time that the executed the 
Forbearance and Extension Agreement. It also cannot be 
legitimately disputed that Guarantors knew of those claims and 
defenses when they signed the agreement. Because Guarantors 
expressly waived any and all defenses they otherwise might have 
had, the District Court's decision in granting summary judgment and 
dismissing Guarantors' Counterclaim was correct. This Court should 
affirm that decision and dismiss Guarantors' appeal. 
-36-
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2. Guarantors1 conduct resulted in a waiver of their 
defenses and Counterclaim. 
In addition to waiving claims and defenses in writing, 
Guarantors waived their claims and defenses by their conduct. 
Waiver results when a party, with knowledge of an existing claim, 
relinquishes that claim by actions or conduct. See B.R. Woodward 
Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Serv., Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
In Woodward, this Court affirmed a summary judgment 
ruling that a party had waived its right to certain commissions 
when the party failed to demand the commissions during the term of 
its employment. Woodward's principal testified: "I felt that 
asking for more money, or . . . even questioning the commission 
situation, might jeopardize my standing in the company and cause 
them to want to cancel my contract. So I just kind of rolled over 
and played dead." Id. at 103. 
This Court refused to accept Woodward's argument that it 
never intended to waive its commissions, finding that Woodward's 
actions constituted a waiver of its right to seek the commissions 
Woodward claimed it was owed: 
We agree that Woodward, by its conduct, waived its 
right to incentive commissions under the Sales Agreement 
with Collins. The evidence is uncontroverted that 
Woodward was aware of the existence of its right to 
receive compensation . . . and that it knew such a claim 
had to be documented by a daily sales report and 
submitted monthly. Nonetheless, Woodward decided to 
"roll over and play dead" as it was "more than willing 
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to settle for $45,000 a year." It was not until after 
the relationship was terminated that Woodward sought what 
it knew it was entitled to receive during the entire 
course of its employment. Such conduct, notwithstanding 
whatever unexpressed subjective intent Woodward's 
principal had, unequivocally evidenced an intent to waive 
its right to claim the incentive commissions. 
Id. at 103-04. 
The Woodward decision is consistent with the Idaho 
Supreme Court case of First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Gaige, 
155 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683 (1988). In Gaige, First Security Bank 
of Idaho extended a series of loans to a company called A.J. Gaige 
Associates. The loans were secured by the guarantee of Mr. Gaige 
and by other collateral. After several unprofitable years, Gaige 
decided to liquidate the company. In connection with the 
liquidation, Gaige, the company, and First Security entered into 
a "loan workout agreement" in July of 1984 in which First Security 
allowed Gaige a four-month period to liquidate the company. Absent 
the agreement, First Security immediately could have sought to 
foreclose on its collateral. 
When the liquidation failed to satisfy the debt, First 
Security brought action against Gaige on the guaranty. Gaige 
responded with defenses and a counterclaim alleging breach of 
contract, fraud, negligence, breach of duty, and rescission. The 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of First Security and 
the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 686. The court held that 
by expressly ratifying his guaranty in connection with the 
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subsequent loan modification, Gaige waived any claim based on 
fraudulent inducement. Id. 
Similarly, Guarantors in this case waived any right to 
assert claims and/or defenses arising in connection with the 
construction loan. The undisputed facts in this case show that 
Guarantors caused Bradford to release the construction loan and 
security in return for the Note and Guarantees. Later, Guarantors 
obtained an extension of the maturity of the Note and Guarantees, 
thereby again affirming the validity of the Guarantees. Under such 
circumstances, the law is clear that Guarantors have waived any 
right to assert the Counterclaim and defenses Guarantors asserted 
in the District Court.24 See Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 357 
P.2d 190, 194 (1960) (right of rescission lost where party made no 
claim for return of money until filing of her counterclaim); 
McKeller Real Estate & Investment Co., et al. v. Paxton, 62 Utah 
97, 218 P. 128, 132 (1923) (waiver found where defendants treated 
the contract as in force until the institution of legal 
proceedings). 
Because Guarantors have waived their defenses and 
Counterclaim, Judge Lewis' grant of Bradford's motion for summary 
24
 Although the question of waiver is generally one of fact, 
"it is perhaps more accurate to view the ultimate conclusion 
whether waiver has occurred, given particular facts, as a question 
of law." Woodward, 754 P.2d at 101. 
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judgment, including dismissal of Guarantors' Counterclaim, was 
proper and should be affirmed by this Court.25 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Lewis properly granted summary judgment in favor 
of Bradford and correctly dismissed Guarantors' Counterclaim. This 
Court should affirm that ruling. 
25
 Guarantors' Counterclaim and defenses also are barred by the 
doctrine of estoppel. In Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 602 P. 2d 689 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme 
Court set forth the following elements necessary to establish an 
estoppel: 
(1) an admission, statement or act [or silence] 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement or act [or silence], and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing 
the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
admission, statement or act [or silence]. 
Id. at 694. The same facts that establish waiver also establish 
estoppel. As previously discussed, despite knowledge of the 
Counterclaim and defenses they now assert, Guarantors represented 
the validity of the Note and Guarantees at issue. Bradford granted 
extensions of time and took other action in reliance on Guarantors' 
acknowledgements and in reliance on Guarantors' failure to assert 
their claims. Having relied on Guarantors' statements, acts, and 
silence, injury to Bradford would result were Guarantors now 
allowed to contradict or repudiate their representations and 
unequivocal conduct. 
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DATED this Q A A day of April, 1992. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
S c o t t F. Young .JEsq. 
Mark F. J a m e s / ^ l s q . 
185 South Stacfce S t r e e t , S u i t e 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF to the 
following: 
Gary J. Anderson, Esq. 
Westpark 
750 North Freedom Blvd., Suite 102 
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* CLvvltCX 
Brad.brf 
- 4 2 -
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JAMES F. KERN, I.N. FISHER, and 
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PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
District Court Civil No. 910900291 CV 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, DISTRICT JUDGE 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
Loan Number: October 7, 1988 
$100,000.00 Salt Lake City, Utah 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, in installments and at the time herein-
after stated, SLC LIMITED IV, a California Limited Partnership 
("Maker") promises to pay to the order of the BRADFORD GROUP 
WEST, INC., a Utah Corporation, its successors and assigns 
("Holder"), at Salt Lake City, Utah, or at such other place as 
the Holder hereof may from time to time designate in writing, 
in lawful money of the United States of America, the principal 
sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) with interest 
on the unpaid principal balance from time to time outstanding 
as follows: 
a) From the date hereof the rate of interest per 
annum shall equal at all times a variable rate which at all 
times is two and one-half percent (2Vi%) above the then quoted 
base interest rate for loans charged and published by The Idaho 
First National Bank (The "Base Rate"), calculated and applied 
on the basis of a 365-day year, increases or decreases in such 
Base Rate being effective concurrently with the effective date 
of each such change. Any changes in the principal interest 
rate under this Note are effective without prior notice. 
For credit to be allowed on the day funds are received, 
such collected funds must be received by the Holder on or 
before 2:00 p.m. that same day. Interest shall be due and 
payable on the first (1st) day of each month throughout the 
term of this Note or any extension hereof, with the first such 
payment due on November 1, 1988. If not previously paid, the 
entire principal balance of this Note, plus all accrued and 
unpaid interest, shall be due and payable in full on or before 
October 7, 1989. 
Unless otherwise provided herein, this Note may be prepaid 
in whole or in part at any time without penalty. 
All payments shall be applied under this Note as follows 
and in the order indicated, at the option of Holder: (1) to 
the repayment of sums advanced by Holder below to protect the 
property which secures this Note or any Guaranty of this Note, 
together with interest thereon at the default rate specified 
below; (2) to the payment of the Holder's attorneys fees and 
other expenses as provided herein; (3) to interest due; and (4) 
to the reduction of principal. 
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EXHIBIT A 
If default be made in the payment of any sums due under 
this Note, or in any other term or condition hereof, or in any 
Trust Deed, Security Agreement, Guaranty, or any other agree-
ment between Maker (or its Guarantors) and Holder pertaining to 
the indebtedness evidenced hereby, then, upon fifteen (15) 
days* written notice of such default from Holder and/or upon 
thirty (30) days' written notice of any non-monetary default, 
default interest shall accrue, at the option of Holder, at five 
percent (5%) per annum over the Base Rate, calculated and 
applied on the basis of a three hundred and sixty-five (365) 
day year, increases or decreases in such base rate being 
concurrent with the effective date of each such change. 
Further, if default be made in the payment of any sums due 
under this Note, or in any other term or condition hereof or in 
any Trust Deed, Security Agreement, Guaranty, or any other 
agreements between Maker (or its Guarantors) and Holder per-
taining to the indebtedness herein, then, upon written notice 
of default from Holder to Maker and Maker's failure to cure 
monetary defaults within fifteen (15) days and/or non-monetary 
defaults within thirty (30) days, at the option of Holder, 
Holder shall cause all of the unpaid principal of this Note, 
with interest accrued thereon, to become immediately due and 
payable. Unpaid accrued interest shall accumulate and be added 
to the then outstanding principal balance on the fifth day of 
each month during default. 
In the event that any payment hereunder shall not be made 
within fifteen (15) days after the due date, a late charge of 
five cents ($.05) for each dollar ($1.00) so overdue may be 
charged by Holder for the purpose of defraying the expense inci-
dent to handling such delinquent payments. Such late charge 
represents the reasonable estimate of Holder and Maker of a 
fair average compensation for the loss that may be sustained by 
Holder due to the failure of Maker to make timely payments. 
Such late charge shall be paid without prejudice to the right 
of Holder to collect any other amounts provided to be paid or 
to declare a default hereunder or under the Trust Deed referred 
to below or any other agreement securing or guaranteeing this 
Note. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein 
or in any other agreement pertaining to the indebtedness evi-
denced hereby, the total liability for payments in the nature 
of interest, additional interest and other charges shall not 
exceed the applicable limits imposed by the interest rate laws 
of the State of Utah. If any payments in the nature of inter-
est, additional interest and other charges made hereunder or 
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under any other agreement pertaining to the indebtedness 
evidenced hereby, are held to be in excess, they shall be 
considered payment of principal hereunder and the indebtedness 
evidenced hereby shall be reduced by such amount so that the 
total liability for payments in the nature of interest, addi-
tional interest and other charges shall not exceed the appli-
cable limits imposed by the interest rate laws of the State of 
Utah in compliance with the desires of Maker and Holder. 
In the event suit be brought hereon, or an attorney be 
employed or expenses be incurred to compel payment of this Note 
or any portion of the indebtedness evidenced hereby, Maker 
promises to pay all such expenses and attorneys' fees, includ-
ing fees on appeal. 
The Maker, endorsers and guarantors of this Note, and each 
of them, hereby waive all homestead and/or exemption rights, 
diligence, presentment, protest and demand, notice of protest 
and demand, notice, notice of dishonor and/or non-payment and 
specifically consent to and waive notice of (1) any renewals or 
extensions of this Note, whether made to or in favor of Maker 
or any other person or persons, (2) release of all or any part 
of the security for the payment hereof, or (3) release of any 
party directly or indirectly liable for this obligation. 
The terms of this Note apply to, inure to the benefit of, 
and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, 
administrators, executors, successors and permitted assigns. 
This Note is secured, without limitation, by a certain 
Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents of even date herewith (the 
•'Trust Deed"), encumbering certain real property (the "Prop-
erty") located in Salt Lake County, Utah. If the Trustor 
therein shall sell, convey, or alienate the Property, or any 
part thereof, or any interest therein, or shall be divested of 
its title or any interest therein in any manner or way, or 
should the composition of Trustor be substantially altered, 
either voluntarily or involuntarily, without the prior written 
consent of Holder, which consent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld. Holder may at its option, without notice, require the 
entire principal balance of this Note, with accrued interest 
and all other sums, to be immediately due and payable. 
This Note is guaranteed by the Unconditional Guaranties of 
Loran Corporation, I. N. Fisher and James F. Kern. 
This Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. 
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If this Note is signed by more than one Maker, the 
obligations of Maker hereunder shall be joint and several. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Maker has executed this Note as of the 
date first written above. 
MAKER: 
SLC LIMITED IV, a California 
Limited Partnership 
By: Loran Corporation, its 
general partner 
By 
SCMBDP321 
I. N. Fisher, President 
By 
James F. Kern, Vice President 
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UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTY 
The undersigned, James F. Kern ("Guarantor11), herob'/ 
unconditionally guarantees to the Bradford Grcun West, Inc., 
its successors and assigns ("Holder"), the full* ccnx-iete and 
prompt payment and performance of all obligations cf~SLC 
Limited IV, a California limited partnership ("Maker"), under 
that certain Promissory Note in the original principal amount 
of $ , dated October , 1988 (the "Note"), The 
Guarantor acknowledges and agrees that he is jointly and 
severally liable for the full amounts owing under the Note. 
From default and until such time as the obligations of 
Maker and ssiy guarantors under the Note and any guaranties are 
paid or satisfied in full, Holder may recover the amounts cved 
on the Note from the Maker and/or guarantors and/or the 
collateral. No action or inaction by the Holder to collect 
from one party or the collateral or any portion therecr shall 
be deemed" a waiver of any right to proceed against any ether 
party or collateral. 
Guarantor waives any rights to an apportionment of 
liability, fault, or damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-37 to 43 (1987, as amended), and any ether rights to 
apportionment of liability, fault, or damages pursuant to ether 
statutes, in ecruity, or at common law, it being expressly 
agreed that the liability and obligation of Guarantor under 
this Guaranty and any other documents executed in connection 
herewith, shall be joint and several with the Maker and any 
other guarantors. It is expressly agreed that Holder may, in 
its sole discretion, waive, release,"modify, forego or forbear 
from exercising any or all rights it may have against the Maker 
or any guarantor pursuant to the terms of the Note, any 
guaranty, security agreement, trust deed or other document 
executed in connection with the note. 
Guarantor further agrees that this Guaranty shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the lavs of Utah, and expressly 
consents to jurisdiction and venue of any suit hereon in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Guarantor agrees and acknowledges that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-37-1 to -9-(1953), does not apply to any action hereon or 
liability created hereby, and that Holcer may sue Guarantor 
hereunder and seek to collect from Guarantor personally without 
looking first, or at ail, to any collateral or trust deed 
securinc the note or any guaranty thereof. 
EXHIBIT B 
This Guaranty is secured by Trust Deed with Assignment of 
Rents, dated October , 1988, executed by Newport Investment 
Associates, a general partnership whose sole general partners 
are James F. Kern and I. N, Fisher, as Trustor, in favor of 
Nevada Title Company, as Trustee, and The Bradford Group West, 
Inc., as Beneficiary, relating to certain real property located 
in Clark County, Nevada (the "Collateral"). 
Guarantor represents and warrants that the Collateral is 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances except as follows: 
Guarantor further represents and warrants that Newport 
Investment Associates has good and merchantable title to the 
Collateral and all necessary authority and right to pledge said 
Collateral to Holder. 
DATED this *?& day of October, 1988. 
c r vi T - . 
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UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTY 
The undersigned, I . N. Fisher ("Guarantor") hereby 
uncondit ional ly guarantees to the Bradford Gr<«gp#est, I n c . , 
i t s successors and ass igns ("Holder"), the f u l l , complete #nd 
prompt payment and performance of a l l ob l i gat fens ~o& -SIX^ 
Limited IV, a Cal i fornia l imited partnership Iffiajser^Q ,-tflafler 
that certa in Promissory Note in the or ig inal Stj^ri^mJ amount 
of $100,000.00, dated October 7, 1988 (the "Nfe/ ') .-CJThe 
undersigned acknowledges and agrees that he i j^&olntly arf& 
severa l l y l i a b l e for the f u l l amounts owing un3er the Uote , 
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hereunder and seek to collect from Guarantor 
looking first, or at all, to any collateral o 
securing the note or any guaranty thereof. 
ShaHJbe 
an<t£xp 
rec .an 
This Guaranty is secured by Trust Deed with Assignment of 
Rents, dated October 7, 1988, executed by Newport Investment 
Associates, a general partnership whose sole general partners 
are James F. Kern and I. N. Fisher, as Trustor, in favor of 
Nevada Title Company, as Trustee, and the Bradford Group West, 
Inc., as Beneficiary, relating to certain real property located 
in Clark County, Nevada (the "Collateral"). 
Guarantor represents and warrants that the Collateral is 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances except as follows: 
(1) First Trust Deed in the original principal amount of 
$1,850,000 to County Savings Bank of Santa Barbara; and (2) 
Second Trust Deed in the original principal amount of $300,000 
to Jerry King. 
Guarantor further represents and warrants that Newport 
Investment Associates has good and merchantable title to the 
Collateral and all necessary authority and right to pledge said 
Collateral to Holder. 
DATED this *?&/ day of October, 1988. 
N. Fisher 
SCMBDP320 
f\ ^f%rx '- & 
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UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTY 
The undersigned, Loran Corporation ("Guarantor"), hereby 
unconditionally guarantees to the Bradford Group West, Inc., 
its successors and assigns ("Holder"), the full, complete and 
prompt payment and performance of all obligations of SLC 
Limited IV, a California limited partnership ("Maker"), under 
that certain Promissory Note in the original principal amount 
of $100,000.00, dated October 7, 1988 (the "Note"). Guarantor 
acknowledges and agrees that it is jointly and severally liable 
for the full amounts owing under the Note. 
From default and until such time as the obligations of Maker 
and any guarantors under the Note and any guaranties are paid or 
satisfied in full, Holder may recover the amounts owed on the 
Note from the Maker and/or guarantors and/or the collateral. No 
action or inaction by the Holder to collect from one party or 
the collateral or any portion thereof shall be deemed a waiver 
of any right to proceed against any other party or collateral. 
Guarantor waives any rights to an apportionment of liabil-
ity, fault, or damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 to 
43 (1987, as amended), and any other rights to apportionment of 
liability, fault, or damages pursuant to other statutes, in 
equity, or at common law, it being expressly agreed that the 
liability and obligation of Guarantor under this Guaranty and 
any other documents executed in connection herewith, shall be 
joint and several with the Maker and any other guarantors. It 
is expressly agreed that Holder may, in its sole discretion, 
waive, release, modify, forego or forbear from exercising any 
or all rights it may have against the Maker or any guarantor 
pursuant to the terms of the Note, any guaranty, security agree-
ment, trust deed or other document executed in connection with 
the Note. 
Guarantor further agrees that this Guaranty shall be inter-
preted in accordance with the laws of Utah, and expressly 
consents to jurisdiction and venue of any suit hereon in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Guarantor agrees and acknowledges that Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-37-1 to -9 (1953), does not apply to any action hereon or 
liability created hereby, and that Holder may sue Guarantor 
hereunder and seek to collect from Guarantor personally without 
looking first, or at all, to any collateral or trust deed secur-
ing the note or any guaranty thereof. 
r>.yy*L5 
EXHIBIT D 
This Guaranty is secured by Security Agreement dated 
October 7, 1988, wherein the collateral is all of Loran 
Corporation's partnership interest in Las Vegas Investment 
Associates and Las Vegas Investment Associates II, both limited 
partnerships, and all accounts receivable and contract rights 
relating thereto or owing to Guarantor by Las Vegas Investment 
Associates and/or Las Vegas Investment Associates II, and all 
proceeds thereof (the "Collateral"). 
Guarantor represents and warrants that the above-described 
Collateral is free and clear of any liens and encumbrances and 
that Guarantor owns a 20% general partnership interest in both 
Las Vegas Investment Associates and Las Vegas Investment 
Associates II, subject to the terms of the limited partnership 
agreements thereof. 
Guarantor further represents and warrants that it has good 
and merchantable title to the Collateral and all necessary 
authority and right to pledge said Collateral to Holder. 
DATED this 1h*f day of October, 1988. 
LORAN CORPORATION 
By J ^ ^ 
SCMBDP318 
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jO) TO CONSTRUCTION LOAN COMMITMENT 4° SECOND MORTGAGE ENDORSEMENT 
SLC Limited IV 
RE: Construction Loan Commitment #85.17C 
Gentlemen: 
This endorsement modifies the terms and conditions of the above 
referenced commitment as set forth below: 
1) Loan Amount 
$2,200,000 
TBGW shall have the right to structure the loan into a 
single loan or, at its sole option, to divide the loan 
into a First and Second Mortgage/Trust Deed in amounts to 
be determined solely by TBGW. 
2) Revised Fee Schedule 
Commitment $ 22,000 
Loan 22,000 
Contingent 100,000 
Total Fees $144,000 
NOTE: $10,500 of the commitment fee is payable upon 
acceptance of this commitment and is non-refundable except 
in the event that certain conditions required by this 
commitment are considered by TBGW to be beyond the 
Borrower's control. The loan fee shall be payable on/or 
before closing of the construction loan. The balance 
of the commitment fee and the loan fee shall be paid at 
closing of the construction loan. The contingent fee 
shall be due and payable upon the sale of the property, 
refinancing of the loan, or at the loan maturity as may be 
extended, whichever comes first. 
3) WmAing 
Second Mortgage shall be advanced on a last-in basis, 
it is the proceeds from the First Mortgage shall be 
fully funded prior to the funding of the Second Mortgage. 
4) Security 
Evidence of indebtedness shall be secured by a First 
Mortgage/Trust Deed and at the sole option of TBGW, a 
EXHIBIT E 
Second Mortgage Endorsement 
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Second Mortgage/Trust Deed in the amounts to be determined 
by TBGW on the fee simple absolute title to the real 
property and the improvements thereto, subject only to 
encumbrances that shall be acceptable to TBGW and free of 
materialmen's liens or special assessments for work 
completed or under construction as of the date of closing. 
5) Other Conditions and Terms 
All conditions of the commitment and of the required 
security documents shall apply equally to both loans as if 
incorporated therein. However, the Second Mortgage shall 
be subordinate to the First Mortgage loan. 
These changes constitute the only changes in the 
commitment and all other terms and conditions remain 
unchanged. 
Sincerely, 
The undersigned accept the terms and conditions of this 
loan commitment: 
SLC LIMITED IV 
Loraa Corporation 
0
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FORBEARANCE AND EXTENSION AGREEMENT 
This Forbearance and Extension Agreement is made by and 
between The Bradford Group West, Inc., a Utah Corporation 
("Lender") and SLC Limited IV, a California limited partnership 
("Borrower") this / J ^ day of August 1990. 
WHEREAS, Lender loaned to the Borrowers $100,000.00 
evidenced by a Promissory Note dated October 17# 1988 and secured 
by certain Deeds of Trust, Security Agreements and Assignments of 
Rent of even date therewith, and guaranteed by I.N. Fisher and 
James F. Kern, all of the above documents hereinafter referred to 
as the Original Loan Documents. 
WHEREAS, the Note matured October 7, 1989, Borrower seeks 
Lender's forbearance from exercising its rights under the default 
provisions of the Original Loan Documents and desires to extend 
the note to December 31, 1990 upon the terms and conditions set 
forth below. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed as follows: 
1. The Borrower agrees to pay principal payments based on 
the following schedule: 
August 1, 1990 $15,000,000 Plus Interest 
SepteJ^jpr 1, 1990 15,000,000 Plus Interest 
Octob**ti# 1990 15,000,000 Plus Interest 
November 1, 1990 15,000,000 Plus Interest 
December 1, 1990 15,000,000 Plus Interest 
1 
EXHIBIT F 
Any remaining principal plus accrued interest shall be paid in 
full on or before December 31, 1990. 
2. Borrower shall (i) at signing pay any delinquent 
interest and (ii) pay interest in full on or before the 1st day 
of each month' at the rate of interest per annum equal at all 
times to a variable rate which at all times is two and one-half 
percent (2 1/2%) above the then quoted base interest rate for 
loans charged and published by West One Bank (The "Base Rate"), 
calculated and applied on the basis of a 365-day year, increases 
or decreases in such Base Rate being effective concurrently with 
the effective date of each such change. Any changes in the 
principal interest rate under the Note are effective without 
prior notice. Failure to pay principal and interest on or before 
the first day of each month shall subject Borrower to late fees 
and penalties as provided in the Note. Failure to pay interest 
on or before the 30th day of each month, shall immediately 
terminate this Agreement and the Note shall become immediately 
due and payable and all default rates, fees and penalties shall 
apply. 
3. In addition the parties agree as follows: 
Borrower upon signing this agreement shall pay $644.52 late 
fee, interest due and all attorneys fees regarding this 
extension. 
2 
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4. By entering into this Forbearance and Extension 
Agreement, Lender shall no way be considered to have waived any 
and all rights or remedies under the original loan documents by 
reason of the default existing at the time of this Agreement. 
Lender shall have full right to exercise all of said rights and 
remedies under the Original Loan Documents immediately upon the 
breach of any provision of this Forbearance and Extension 
Agreement. 
5. Borrower hereby warrants and agrees that to the date 
hereof, Lender is not in breach of any of the terms and 
conditions of the Original Loan Documents. 
6. Borrower hereby waives any defenses to payment or 
performance or rights to setoff it may have as of the date hereof 
relating to the Original Loan Documents. 
"Lender" 
The Bradford Group West, Inc. 
SLC Limited IV, a California 
Limited Partnership with Loran 
Corporation, a California 
corporation as itsy^eneral partner 
ITS. Fisher, President 
By
 L>» 
James F.\Kern, Vice President 
000^70 
Accepted and agreed to t h i s Q ^ c l a y of August 1990 
Guarantors 
I.N* Fisher , Guarantor 
i \ >0Cf7t 
